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WORKER FLOWS AND FIRM DYNAMICS
IN A LABOR MARKET MODEL∗
CARLOS HENRIQUE L. CORSEUIL
Abstract
In this paper we build an integrated framework of the labor market in
which worker replacement, job creation and job destruction are decided si-
multaneously at the firm level, providing a rigorous instrument for the analy-
sis of worker flows. The main features of the model are uncertainty related to
worker × firm match quality and search frictions. Worker flow components
are decided as firms learn about the quality of their matches. A negative cor-
relation between replacement and job creation arises from this mechanism.
The model also provides several implications for firm dynamics, which are
all confirmed by related empirical papers.
∗This material is based on the first chapter of my PhD dissertation developed at Uni-
versity College London. I would like to thank Miguel Foguel, Steffen Pischke, Francis
Kramarz, Jean-Marc Robin and Daniel Santos who contributed to significant improve-
ment in this paper. The paper also benefited from comments by the participants in the
Labor Market Dynamic Growth conference and the European Association of Labour Eco-
nomics, both in 2007. I would also like to thank CAPES for the financial support.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent literature on employment dynamics established two empirical regular-
ities. The first is the large heterogeneity in employment growth even across
similar firms. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) surveyed several papers on this
topic and showed that a significant share of the total variance in employment
growth is due to the within group component.1 The second fact is that job
flows and worker replacement occur simultaneously at the firm level, both
with significant magnitudes. For instance, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)2 re-
port job flow rates between 15% and 24%, which represent between 41% and
56% of total worker flow rates for annual data of three developed countries.3
The main goal of the present paper is to elaborate a theoretical frame-
work that encompasses both of these facts, providing a rigorous instrument
for the analysis of worker flows. The framework developed in this paper also
has other interesting worker flows predictions that can be used to assess how
close the theory matches reality. The model suggests that job creation and
replacement should be negatively related to each other, which finds empir-
ical support in a companion paper, Corseuil (2009). It also suggests that
replacement is negatively related to both wage level and wage growth.
It turns out that the way we model the labor market also generates impli-
cations for firm dynamics, even employing the simplest representation of the
product market. We offer the following predictions, all confirmed by results
1At least 80% according to table 5 in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) which reports
results for 13 countries.
2See table 9 in their paper.
3See similar numbers in Hamermesh et al. (1996), Davis and Haltiwanger (1998), Albaek
and Sorensen (1998), Abowd et al. (1999), and Burgess et al. (2000).
2
on firm dynamics surveyed in Sutton (1997); Caves (1998); and Bartelsman
and Doms (2000):
- Homogeneous firms (in terms of observable characteristics such as in-
dustry, size and age) attain distinct performance levels measured either
as productivity at the end of the first period or job creation in the sec-
ond period.
- The higher a firm’s initial productivity level, the higher its employment
growth.
- Job creation for surviving firms in the second period is negatively cor-
related with labor force size at the end of the first period.
- The correlation between job creation and initial size mentioned above
tends not to be valid for the largest firms.
- This relationship approaches Gibrat’s Law if we consider the overall
population of firms.
- Firms that in the first period are relatively more productive tend to
keep this position in the second period.
- Smaller firms have lower probability of surviving than larger firms.
- The variance of employment growth is larger for smaller firms than for
larger firms.
The driving force behind our model is a learning mechanism taking place
inside the firm about the quality of its matches with employees. This match
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quality is assumed to be a non-observable variable, a priori, but eventually
will be learned by the firm, which might then seek to improve the overall
match composition by trying to form new high quality matches either as
part of a worker replacement or a job creation process. We develop a par-
ticular formulation for a turnover model which adds search friction to the
uncertainty faced by firms concerning the quality of matches. Such complex
hiring decisions are mainly responsible for broadening the scope of relevant
facts beyond worker flows to firm dynamics.
Most predictions in our paper on firm dynamics are shared with other
papers such as Ericson and Pakes (1995); and Klette and Kortum (2004).
However, the present paper does not rely on modeling a complex production
process with strategic investment decisions taking place, as is the case in those
papers. They address investment decisions on R&D or quality improvement,
which is more suitable for a high-tech environment. Alternatively, the scope
of our model encompasses any firm, from those with the most primitive
to those with the most complex production process. To the best of our
knowledge, no similar framework is available in the literature. The originality
of the model also applies to the worker flow facts encompassed among it’s
predictions.
It is worth mentioning that Pries (2004); Pries and Rogerson (2005); Mu-
nasingue (2005); Moscarini (2005); and Burgess and Turon (2005) followed a
similar strategy, combining turnover models with models of search friction.
However, in all those papers, firm size is fixed to one job position, which
makes them silent on firm dynamics. We relax that restriction in the present
paper. Finally, the interaction between firms’ strategic decisions on the labor
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market and implications beyond employment dynamics towards firm dynam-
ics is also addressed by Morita (2008). However, his focus is on training
decisions as opposed to hiring decisions.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows:
We start with a simpler version of the model, which is the object of the
next two sections. In section 2 we introduce a simpler version of the model
set-up, where jobs are destroyed exogenously, firms set wages, and are allowed
to hire at most one worker per period. The solution for this simpler version
of the model is derived in section 3. After getting used to the notation
and mechanics of the model, we relax the restriction on hiring in section 4.
Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to even more general versions of the model where
firms bargain wages with workers and jobs are destroyed endogenously. In
each of these sections, we discuss how abolishing the restrictive assumptions
enlarges the set of model predictions. The final section summarizes the main
contributions.
2 THE BARE-BONES MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 Timing and Information
• Timing
Time is discrete and has two distinct periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. Agents’ dis-
count rate is ρ. Decisions are made only at the beginning of each time
period, when search and matching processes occur instantaneously.
Any new information becomes available at the end of the first period.
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• Match quality
There are two types of worker × firm matches: high quality (+) and
low quality (-). They are defined according to the productivity levels,
which are 1 and θ respectively.
• Learning
Any new worker × firm combination has, a priori, the probability s of
attaining the higher level of productivity.
The true value for the quality of the match is revealed to the current
employer at the end of the first period.
2.2 Labor Supply
• Worker population
Worker population is fixed and denoted by L.
• Search activity
Only unemployed workers search for jobs (no on-the-job searches oc-
cur).
• Worker decision process
If an offer is made, the unemployed worker decides whether or not to
accept it. When accepting, (s)he becomes employed earning wage w,
while b is the reward if (s)he remains unemployed.
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2.3 Labor Demand
• Size limitation
Firms can post at most one vacancy per period, so the maximum em-
ployment level is one worker in the first period, and two workers in the
second period.
• Firm’s population
Any firm can enter the market in either time period, as long a start-up
lump sum cost ν is paid.
• Job destruction
Throughout t1, firms may be hit, with exogenous probability (η), by a
negative productivity shock, forcing them to leave the market at the
end of this period.
• Production technology
All firms produce the same good using the same technology, based
solely on the employment level of each type of match.4
f(`+t , `
−
t ) = `
+
t + θ · `−t .
• Product market
Firms are price takers and goods are sold at a fixed price (p).
4The following properties for technology apply: i)constant marginal productivity for
both types of workers (1 for high type and θ for low type) and ii) constant returns to scale.
Note that under these circumstances the first period production level corresponds to the
productivity of the single match, if there is a match.
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2.4 Match Technology
• Firm’s search activity and wage setting
Firms post vacancies and set wages on the spot market.
• Match probability
An aggregate matching function m(U bt , Vt) with constant returns to
scale is the key determinant of the probability of a firm filling a vacancy,
which is represented byM(U bt , Vt)/Vt = m(U
b
t /Vt) = m(γt). The inputs
correspond to the total number of job-seeking workers at the beginning
of each period (U bt ) and the aggregate number of vacancies (Vt). The
ratio U bt /Vt hereafter is denoted by γt.
• Vacancy cost in the replacement process
A search component of vacancy cost (crep) is paid when vacancies are
posted. This is the only cost paid by the firm when the vacancy is
caused by a replacement process.
• Vacancy costs for new jobs
Vacancies caused by the creation of new job positions incur a higher
cost (cjc) due to an incremental component (c) as described by the
equation below:
cjc = crep + c.
The interpretation o c will be discussed in the next section.
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• No vacancy storage
If a vacancy is not filled in the first period, the firm has to pay the
associated cost if it decides to post the vacancy again in the second
period.
2.5 Critical Comments on Selected Assumptions
Most of the assumptions listed above are used frequently in search models
of the labor market. What follows is a brief overview of some of the present
paper’s key assumptions about which there is no consensus in the literature.
The assumption of match-specific productivity levels is present in Jo-
vanovic (1979) and other articles that use his framework to address worker
turnover. It contrasts with the assumption on workers’ intrinsic productivity
used by Gibbons and Katz (1991) among others. Both share the successful
prediction of a negative hazard rate, but they generate different predictions
concerning welfare loss of displaced workers. Welfare loss of displaced work-
ers due to adverse selection arises only in an environment where productivity
is intrinsic to the worker. Empirical papers testing this prediction are not
conclusive. While the results in Gibbons and Katz (1991) favor predictions
related to workers’ intrinsic productivity, those in Grund (1999); and Song
(2007) reject them.
The assumption of a higher vacancy cost for job creation relative to re-
placement is also employed in Pries and Rogerson (2005). It can be ratio-
nalized combining two assumptions. First, that any worker needs a unit of
capital to produce, which should be bought by the firm before hiring occurs.
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Second, this unit is fully depreciated if not used, and has no depreciation at
all if it is used. Alternatively, we can define this extra cost as a maintenance
cost for the capital while it is not in use.
Finally, the assumptions on exogenous job destruction, wage setting and
size limitation are not discussed here because each of them will be the focus
of specific sections of this paper devoted to generalizations of the framework
that cames from relaxing those assumptions.
3 THE BARE-BONES MODEL SOLUTION
3.1 Labor Demand Policy
For the sake of simplifying the exposition of the solution, we begin by dis-
cussing labor demand assuming that firms have enough bargaining power to
extract all the rent from their workers, setting wages at the same value of
what workers gain from unemployment (w = b). Later in this section, we
show that this can result from the combination of no on-the-job searches and
the productivity level being specific to the match.
Under these circumstances, the combination of constant returns to scale
with the hiring limit makes labor demand trivial for start-ups. Those firms
which decide to enter the market in the first period will post one vacancy.
The same cannot be said for incumbent firms in the second period. Firms
in this situation also benefit from posting another vacancy, but they have to
choose between two alternatives: i) post a vacancy to replace the worker hired
in the first period, or ii) post a vacancy to create a new job position, while
keeping the worker hired in the first period. We will analyze this situation
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in detail according to the type of match formed in the first period.
3.1.1 Incumbent firms with a high quality match
We show in this section that a firm which learns it holds a high quality match
will prefer to create a new job position with the single vacancy rather than
to replace its worker hired in the first period. The expected profit related to
the latter choice (r) can be written as:
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r | ξ1 = 1)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− crep,
where the first term corresponds to the profit component related to the pro-
duction from a match with the expected quality value, taking into account
the chance that no match can be formed. The last component is the hiring
cost that needs to be paid anyway. If the firm decides to choose the job
creation alternative (jc), the analogous equation is the following:
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(jc | ξ1 = 1)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− cjc + (p− b).
Apart from changing the hiring cost component depending on the reason
for hiring, this expression has an extra term corresponding to the profit
component related to the production of the worker hired in the first period.
One can see that in order for a firm to choose the latter alternative, the
following condition should hold:
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p− b > c.
But it is easy to see that the condition does hold since:
p− b > {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2) = cjc > c,
where the equality above comes from the zero profit condition for start-ups
associated with the free entry assumption.5
3.1.2 Incumbent firms with a low quality match
The expected profits for a firm that learns it holds a low quality match will
be the following in case of deciding in favor of replacement or job creation,
respectively:
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r | ξ1 = θ)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− crep;
and
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(jc | ξ1 = θ)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− cjc + p · θ − b.
The optimal choice now depends on the comparison between p · θ− b and
c. We will focus on the more interesting case where:
5This same condition implies that in equilibrium the profit associated with creating a
new job position will be the same as that associated with keeping only the first period
worker (not posting a vacancy).
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0 < p · θ − b < c
In this case, the optimal choice is to fire the worker and post a vacancy
to replace him. The condition above seems reasonable, since it says that the
rent extracted from the low quality match is positive, but not too large so
that keeping the worker is not the best alternative.
3.2 Model Overview and Micro Implications
The labor market represented in our model evolves in the following way.
Initially, firms post a vacancy with the corresponding wage. The match
quality will vary among firms which succeed in hiring a worker. Firms may
then decide to open a new vacancy either to replace the incumbent employee
or to create a new position. Displaced workers will enter the job seekers’ pool
together with unemployed workers and those coming from firms that have
left the market.
It turns out that firms’ decisions on replacement and job creation de-
pend on the quality of their matches, where low quality matches lead to
replacement and high quality matches to job creation. These heterogeneous
decisions lead to the following implications related to the dynamics on size
and productivity, which constitute established facts in the empirical litera-
ture where these issues are analyzed:6
- Firms whose observable characteristics are homogeneous (industry, size
6See for instance Bartelsman and Doms (2000); and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) who
report results concerning productivity and job flows respectively.
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and age) attain distinct performance levels measured either as produc-
tivity at the end of the first period or job creation in the second period;
and
- The higher a firm’s initial productivity level, the higher its employment
growth.
A new finding of the model is the negative correlation between the number
of workers replaced and the number of jobs created in the second period.
However, the limit of only one vacancy per period imposes this negative
correlation, since firms are forced to choose only one of these actions. Our
goal in the next section is to build a theoretical framework where firms may
create new job positions and replace workers simultaneously. In addition,
we show that the negative correlation between these variables still holds
when we allow firms to choose freely the number of vacancies posted in each
period. Moreover, this less restrictive environment also will provide richer
implications concerning firm dynamics. Before moving to the next section
we dedicate the remainder of this section to discussing two issues that were
previously unaddressed: wage determination and model closure.
3.3 Wage and Labor Supply Determination
The object of this section is to provide more details on labor supply and
wage determination. In each of the two time periods, these variables are
determined through a game involving firms and workers as described below.
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3.3.1 First period
Firms move first, offering wages that maximize their expected profit condi-
tioned on their beliefs about workers’ acceptance policy. Equilibrium occurs
when the workers’ acceptance policy for the observed wage offer profile cor-
responds to the firms’ beliefs.
In equilibrium, firms will offer constant and homogeneous wages equiva-
lent to the unemployment benefit (wt = b) and any unemployed worker will
accept such an offer if (s)he gets one.
It is easy to see that this is a Nash equilibrium. Given search frictions,
workers would accept any wage offer greater than or equal to b. Conditioned
on this acceptance policy, firms maximize their profits by offering b.
3.3.2 Second period
In the second period firms are involved in two games.
The first, played with workers who were unemployed in the first period,
is described in the same way as in the first period. In this game it is easy to
see that the same results apply.
The other game is played with incumbent workers who have just revealed
their productivity levels to the current employer. The existence of two types
of matches is a relevant departure point from the usual assumptions present
in search models.
Nevertheless, the assumptions of no on-the-job search and match specific
productivity, as opposed to worker specific productivity, imply that the out-
side option to join the job seeking pool of workers is the same for any worker
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in the second period and also the same one that prevailed in the first period.7
Therefore, this game is equivalent to the previous one and, once more, the
equilibrium is w = b.
One can see this solution as a particular case of a wage bargain framework
where the firms extract all the rent. Cooper et al. (2007), for example,
formulate the wage setting process this way.
3.4 Model Closure
As mentioned earlier, the zero profit condition for start-ups related to the
entry cost assumption imposes the following restriction on parameter values
in the second period:
{p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2) = cjc + ν.
From this relationship comes the solution for the probability of filling a
vacancy, m(γ2). The analogous zero profit condition for start-ups in the first
period is a bit more cumbersome, since it also addresses the present value of
the expected profit in the second period, as shown below:
m(γ1)·{s·p·(1−θ)+(p·θ−b)− c
jc
m(γ1)
− ν
m(γ1)
+ρ′·s·m(γ2)·(p−b)+ρ′·(1−s)·c} = 0.
However it can be seen that the expression above is just a function of
m(γ1) and m(γ2). We can then derive the value of the first parameter,
7As in the first period the job seeker pool is considered by the firms as a homogeneous
group (any element has probability s to take part in a highly productive match).
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provided that we previously have solved the value for the second parameter.
The fact that we have assumed that m(γt) is a monotonic transformation
of γt means that we can recover the values of γ1 and γ2. These parameters
are the ratio between the number of job seeking workers and the number of
vacancies at the beginning of the respective periods. In the first period, all
workers are job seekers, which sets U b1 = L.
The last step for the closure of the model in the first period is to obtain
the value of V1, the aggregate vacancy level in the first period, from γ1 and
U b1 = L. Note that in this version of the model, V1 also corresponds to the
number of firms posting vacancies at the beginning of the first period.8 The
aggregate vacancy level in the second period, V2, can be obtained in the
same way. However the number of job seeking workers in the beginning of
the second period, U b2 , does not corresponds to L anymore. In the second
period we have to address the inflows and outflows from unemployment as
shown below:
U b2 = U1 + JD +R = (L−M1) + η ·M1 + (1− η) · (1− s) ·M1,
whereM1 stands for the number of matches formed in the first period, which
corresponds to m(γ1) · V1. It is easy too see that U b2 depends on quantities
that have their values already determined above. Then we can plug U b2 into
m(γ2) to get the value of V2. The number of vacancies posted in the second
period by incumbent firms is (1−η)·m(γ1)·V1, while the remaining vacancies
8This is not the same as the number of operating firms in the first period due to search
frictions.
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will be posted by start-ups.
4 THE MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS VACANCY LEVELS
The aim of this section is to generalize the theoretical framework to allow
firms to choose freely the number of vacancies posted. Obviously this proce-
dure will make the analysis of the labor demand policy more cumbersome.
On the other hand, wage and labor supply determinations remain unchanged.
For this version of the model, we still rely on most of the assumptions stated
previously. Those that need to be amended are restated below.
4.1 Assumptions
• Size limitation II
Firms can hire any number of workers in either time period.
• Match probability II
The probability of a firm filling `t of its vt open vacancies is independent
of the number of posted vacancies, and given by m(γt) as before.
• Vacancy cost in the replacement process II
The search component of vacancy cost is convex. For the sake of conve-
nience, we will use the following quadratic parametrization, crep(vt) =
a · v2, with a > 0 defining the curvature of this cost function.
• Vacancy cost for new jobs II
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A vacancy due to the creation of a new job position has an extra linear
component to be paid. The following equation summarizes the relation
between the two cost components: cjc(vt) = c
rep(vt) + c · v, with c > 0.
The assumption of convex vacancy cost deserves comment. It is shared
with Bertola and Caballero (1994); Bertola and Garibaldi (2001); Garibaldi
(2006); and Garibaldi and Moen (2008). This is a critical assumption for our
results on firm dynamics. Although it contrasts with the standard assump-
tion of linear costs present in most unemployment matching models, it is an
assumption critical to our results on firm dynamics. Not only do Garibaldi
and Moen (2008) provide theoretical justification for this assumption, there
also is empirical evidence supporting the convex shape. Yashiv (2000) points
out that a structural estimation of the standard matching model performs
better with convex than with linear specification for the hiring cost. Cooper
et al. (2004) claim that a quadratic shape with a disruption component fits
the data better than the alternatives considered, including the linear case.9
An important difference to be noted in these two papers is that the first uses
gross hirings and separations as a measure of labor adjustment while the
second uses net employment growth. Hence, the intercept in Cooper et al.
(2004) may be related to the fact that firms may pay adjustment costs even
when they do not grow, as long as they hire workers to replace others.
9Cooper et al. (2004) stress that the quadratic component is close to zero, but its
inclusion does improve the fit to the data.
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4.2 Labor Demand
The problem of choosing the vacancy level raises the level of complexity
of labor demand policy in both periods. In the second period, firms now
have to address two choices, which are: 1) how much to spend on improving
the quality of the matches; and 2) how much to spend on increasing the
number of jobs. The first choice consists in choosing the number of workers
to be replaced, while the second consists of choosing the number of vacancies
allocated to job creation. In the first period, firms now face a dynamic
environment, in that their first period decisions on vacancy level will affect
their available choices in the second period. Therefore, the solution to the
firm problem will be stated below in the form of backward induction.
4.2.1 Start-up in the second period
Employment policy for start-up firms in the second period is the simplest
case to be considered since the choice set for these firms is not influenced by
past decisions. In this case, firms just choose the number of vacancies to post
(v2). The profit of a firm which hires `
+
2 and `
−
2 when posting v2 vacancies is
represented by the following equation:
pi2(v2 | `+2 , `−2 ) = p · (`+2 + θ · `−2 )− b · `2 − cjc(v2)− ν.
However `+2 and `
−
2 are not under the firm’s control. They are defined by
the success rate in filling vacancies (µ2) and the proportion of high quality
matches (ξ2). These random variables have expected values s and m(γ2)
respectively. Therefore, the firm’s objective function to be maximized is the
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expected profit concerning these two variables, as described by:
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(v2)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2) · v2 − a · v22 − c · v2 − ν.
The convex shape of the cost function guarantees that there is only one
maximum associated with an optimal vacancy level, to which we will refer
as vst2 . It is easy to see that
vst2 =
{p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− c
2 · a .
The only endogenous parameter on the right side of this equation ism(γ2),
which is determined by the free entry condition.10
4.2.2 Incumbent firms in the second period
Employment policy in the second period is more complex for incumbent firms.
Between the first and second periods, they decide on the number of workers
to be replaced (r) and the number of new job positions to be created (jc),
having been informed about first period labor force size (`1) and the quality
of the matches (ξ1). We can write in the following way the second period
profit of a firm which hires `+2 and `
−
2 , when posting r vacancies devoted to
replace workers in low quality matches and jc vacancies to create new job
positions:
10There is a unique value for this parameter that is associated with zero profit for
start-ups in the second period.
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pi2(r, jc | `+2 , `−2 , `+1 , `−1 ) = p · (`+2 + θ · `−2 )− b · `2−
p · (`+1 + θ · `−1 )− b · `1 − [(p · θ − b) · r] + [cjc(jc+ r)− c · r].
The terms on the right side in the first row refer to the profit compo-
nent derived from the production associated to workers hired in the second
period. The second row starts with the profit component derived from the
production associated to workers hired in the first period, discounting the
related production of those workers replaced in the second period. The last
term corresponds to vacancy costs taking into account that some of these
may be allocated to replacement while the remaining to job creation. All the
other terms have straightforward interpretations.
The equation above uses the following facts:
- Any displacement of workers not related to a replacement process is
not considered since both types of matches are profitable; 11 and
- Firms will never replace any worker in a high quality match, since no
new worker can be more profitable.
As mentioned earlier, the objective function to be maximized by the firms
is the expected profit regarding the random variables ξ2 and µ2, which can
be described as below:12
11This comes from the fact that p · θ > b.
12We use the facts that `+1 = ξ1 · `1 and `−1 = (1− ξ1) · `1.
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Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2) · (jc+ r)−
cjc(jc+ r) + p · [ξ1 · `1 + θ · (1− ξ1) · `1]− b · `1 + [c− (p · θ − b)] · r.
Note that the number of replacements should be no greater than the
number of low quality matches, therefore, the incumbent firms’ problem can
be stated as:
max
r,jc
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)] (1)
s.t. r ≤ `−1 .
The application of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem is shown
in Appendix A. The optimal number of worker replacements and job creation
shown in figure 1 are defined as:
r∗ =
 `
−
1 , `
−
1 < `
−
`−, `−1 ≥ `−
(2)
and
jc∗ =
 `
− − `−1 , `−1 < `−
0, `−1 ≥ `−;
(3)
where:
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`− =
z2
2 · a
and
`− =
z2 + k
2 · a ;
with z2 and k defined as:
z2 = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− c
and
k = [c− (p · θ − b)].
Note that in the previous section we have mentioned that we would con-
sider the case where (p · θ − b) < c, which in turn guarantees that `− < `−.
There are two important features to be stressed in these expressions.
First, the solution for the choice variables is guided by the number of low
quality matches. So, the heterogeneity of the latter variable across firms im-
plies heterogeneous choices of replacement and job creation as well. Second,
when the levels of job creation and replacement are compared across firms,
it turns out that they are negatively related to each other at the ratio of one-
to-one for some region below a threshold level of `−1 and they then become
unrelated to each other for higher values of `−1 .
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4.2.3 Start-ups in the first period
We are now ready to tackle the problem that firms face in the first period
using the results derived above. It will be useful to denote the value function
of the expected profit at the beginning of the second period, conditioned on
realizations of ξ1 and `1 as:
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r
∗, jc∗, ξ1, `1)]
This represents the expected profit for a firm that behaves optimally in
the second period, having hired `1 workers in the first period, among which
the share of good matches turns out to be ξ1.
Note that the values of ξ1 and `1 are not known at the beginning of the
first period. At this time firms may infer these values conditioned on the
vacancy level chosen (v1).
Denoting as ρ′ the composed discount rate that takes into account the
survival probability (ρ′ = ρ · (1− η)), the first period decision can be repre-
sented as
max
v1
E1[pi(v1)] = max
v1
{E1[pi1(v1)] + ρ′ · E1[pi∗2 | v1]}. (4)
The first term in the right hand side can be written as
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EξEµ1 [pi1(v1)] =
{p1 · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ1) · v1 − cjc(v1)− ν =
(z1 − c) · v1 − a · (v1)2 − ν,
where
z1 = {p1 · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ1).
As shown in Appendix B, E1[pi
∗
2 | v1] is defined as
E1[pi
∗
2 | v1] = z1 ·v1−ν+

(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2,
v1 > v1
(z2 + k) · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 − a · E1[(`−1 )2 | v1],
v1 < v1 < v1
z2 · `− + k · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 − a · (`−)2,
v1 < v1.
We can now define inter-temporal profit as
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E1[pi1(v1) + ρ
′ · E1[pi∗2 | v1]] = [1 + ρ′] · z1 · v1 − a · (v1)2 − c · v1+
(5)
ρ′ ·

(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2, v1 > v1
−a · E1[(`−1 )2 | v1] + (z2 + k) · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1, v1 < v1 < v1
z2 · `− − a · (`−)2 + k · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1, v1 < v1.
The equation above combines quadratic and linear terms in v1. This
guarantees that local maxima are well defined. Nevertheless, the uniqueness
of a global maximum depends on the values imposed for the parameters of the
model. Figure 2 aids in understanding the above expression. In Appendix C
we show that global maximum uniqueness is attained for a sufficiently large
s.
Note that even when firms post the same number of vacancies, they will
differ in two aspects at the end of the first period: i) labor force size and ii) la-
bor force composition. These are consequences of the stochastic environment
in which hiring occurs.13
13Another dimension in which firms will differ at this stage is productivity as an obvious
consequence of the heterogeneities described previously. Firms’ average productivity can
be expressed as ξ1 + θ · (1− ξ1).
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4.3 Updates in Model Overview and Micro Predictions
One of the main goals of the model developed above was to reproduce the
fact that some firms replace workers and create new jobs simultaneously. The
mechanism of firm dynamics that comes from the enriched set of assumptions
used in this version of the model generates other predictions which can be
used to check the pertinence of the model.
The dynamic mechanism of this version of the model is very similar to
the one used for the simpler version described earlier. The difference is that
the driving force here is the number of low quality matches formed in the
first period. Those firms with low levels of `− create jobs and replace fewer
workers. Those firms with high levels of `− focus their hiring efforts on the
replacement process and create relatively fewer jobs or even do not create
any jobs at all.
Bearing in mind that µt and ξt are independent, the initial level of low
quality matches is positively correlated with the initial labor force size. As
a consequence of this result we predict that:
- Job creation in the second period is negatively correlated to labor force
size at the end of the first period.
This corresponds to the correlation between size and growth for surviving
firms pointed by Sutton (1997). The author writes: “...the proportional rate
of growth of a firm (or plant) conditional on survival is decreasing in size.”14
Note that in our model there is a threshold initial level of `− above which
the vacancy level does not depend on this variable anymore. Therefore we
14op. cit., page 46.
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can add the following remark to the prediction above:
- The relationship between job creation and initial size pointed out before
tends not to be valid for the largest firms.
This is precisely how Caves (1998) puts the relationship between employ-
ment growth and initial size: “...mean growth rates of firms decrease with
their initial sizes among small firms; for initially large firms growth rates and
size are unrelated.”15
In terms of productivity, the model predicts that those firms in disadvan-
tage (high `−1 ) will make more effort to improve the composition concerning
match quality. Hence, there is a catch-up process in terms of match quality
composition which, in other words, means a catch-up in terms of productiv-
ity. It is not difficult to see that the catch-up is limited as described below:
- Firms that in the first period are relatively more productive tend to
keep this relative position in the second period.
This prediction finds strong support, this time from Bartelsman and
Doms (2000): “...highly productive firms today are more than likely to be
highly productive firms tomorrow...”16.
5 WAGE BARGAINING
We will show that the problem that firms solve to determine their hiring
policy under wage bargaining is extremely similar to the one postulated under
15op. cit., page 1976.
16op. cit., page 571.
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the wage setting environment developed in the previous sections. The set-up
is the same as the previous model except for the assumption on wage setting
which can now be stated as:
• Firm’s search activity and wage setting II
Firms post vacancies and bargain wages on the spot market, with bar-
gaining power 1− β.
5.1 Model Solution: Wage Determination
Based on the last assumption, the wage determination can be easily devel-
oped. Bargaining will be conducted conditioned on the information available
for match productivity. This information determines the rent to be split
between firm and worker according to their respective bargaining power.
Therefore we have three possible situations:17
• An ongoing match in the second period revealed to be of high quality,
in which case the wage is defined as:
w+ = β · p+ (1− β) · b;
• An ongoing match in the second period revealed to be of low quality,
in which case the wage is defined as:
w− = β · p · θ + (1− β) · b;
17The derivations of the value for the wage given the value of the match productivity are
straightforward and used in several papers relying on the search and match framework.
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and;
• A newly formed match either in the first or second period in which case
the productivity is not known and the expected value is s+ (1− s) · θ.
Therefore the wage is:
we = β · p · [s+ (1− s) · θ] + (1− β) · b.
5.2 Model Solution: Labor Demand
5.2.1 Start-up in the second period
As developed in the previous section, start-ups in the second period choose
the number of vacancies that maximize their expected profit, which in this
case becomes
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(v2)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− we} ·m(γ2) · v2 − a · v22 − c · v2 − ν.
Using the value derived above for we, we have
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(v2)] = (1−β) · {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2) ·v2−a ·v22− c ·v2−ν.
It is easy to see that the only difference from the analogous definition in
the wage setting version of the model is the pre-multiplication of (1 − β) in
the first term. This is also the case for the value of vst2 , that can be derived
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as:
vst2 =
(1− β) · {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− c
2 · a .
5.2.2 Incumbent firms in the second period
Again, the objective function to be maximized by firms is the expected profit
regarding the random variables ξ2 and µ2. Under wage bargaining, it can be
described as:18
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)] = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− we} ·m(γ2) · (jc+ r)−
cjc(jc+ r) + `1 · {(p · ξ1 − w+) + [p · θ · (1− ξ1)− w−]}+ [c− (p · θ − w−)] · r.
Using the values derived above for we, w+ and w− we have
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)] = (1− β) · {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2) · (jc+ r)−
cjc(jc+ r) + (1− β) · `1 · [(p · ξ1 − b) + p · θ · (1− ξ1)− b] + [c− (1− β) · (p · θ − b)] · r.
As in previous sections, the firm labor demand decision can be solved
through the following maximization problem:
18We use the facts that `+1 = ξ1 · `1 and `−1 = (1− ξ1) · `1.
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max
r,jc
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)] (6)
s.t. r ≤ `−1 .
The only difference from the analogous definition for the expected profit
in the wage setting version of the model is the pre-multiplication of (1−β) in
some terms. So the solution for this maximization problem will be analogous
to the one developed for the wage setting version of the model, where both
replacement level and job creation depend on `−1 and the parameters of the
model, as shown in figure 1. The only adaptation necessary for this version
of the model is that the expressions for `−1 and `
−
1 include β:
`
′− =
z
′
2
2 · a
and
`′− =
z
′
2 + k
′
2 · a
where z
′
2 and k
′
are defined as:
z
′
2 = (1− β) · {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b} ·m(γ2)− c
k
′
= [c− (1− β) · (p · θ − b)].
In Appendix D we show that this similarity between the wage bargaining
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version of the model and the wage setting version depends on a necessary
condition being met: that the probability of finding a job (m(γ2)
γ2
) is not too
high for a job seeking worker at the beginning of the second period.
5.3 Predictions on Wage Dynamics
The introduction of wage variation with the wage bargaining set-up devel-
oped above allows us to expand the scope of model predictions on worker
flows. It is easy to realize the following relationship between wages and
worker flows:
- At the individual level, the probability of remaining employed in the
same firm is positively associated with the wage level in the second
period and the wage growth between the two periods.
This prediction is confirmed by the findings of Topel and Ward (1992), a
widely quoted empirical paper on the determinants of the mobility of (young)
workers. As a consequence of this result, we may state that:
- At the firm level, the average wage level in the second period is nega-
tively correlated to the replacement level.
This finds support in Galizzi and Lang (1998), which seems to be the
only empirical paper relating wages and turnover at the firm level.
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6 ENDOGENOUS JOB DESTRUCTION
6.1 Generalizing Incumbent Firms’ Decisions
Until now we have assumed that all firms face a positive probability of leaving
the market at the end of the first period due to an exogenous negative shock.
Now we want to relax this assumption. We follow standard models of firm
dynamics and allow firms to choose, at the end of the first period, whether to
continue or stop their operations. In case of giving up, they are compensated
with a scratch value (ψ) and their employees will join the group of workers
searching for jobs between the end of the first period and the start of the
second period. In case of continuing their activities, they choose replacement
and job creation levels as described in the last section. The firm decision in
the second period can be written then as
max
r,jc,χ
χ · Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)] + (1− χ) · ψ (7)
s.t. r ≤ `−1 ,
where χ values 1 when the firm decides to continue and 0 otherwise. We
can see this problem as adding another layer to the decision process of the
firm. After solving for the optimal levels of r and jc based on the expected
profit associated with continuing their operations, firms compare this later
magnitude with ψ to decide whether to continue or not.
In what follows we show how the decision rule is defined. For the sake of
simplicity we will work with the wage setting version of the model. First, it is
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more convenient to write the value function of the second period continuation
expected profit as a function of `−1 and `
+
1 :
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r
∗, jc∗, `−1 , `
+
1 )] = p · [`+1 θ · `−1 ]− b · (`+1 + `−1 )
(8)
z2 · `− + k · `−1 − a · (`−)2, `−1 < `−
(z2 + k) · `−1 − a · (`−1 )2, `− < `−1 < `−
(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2, `−1 > `−.
The second step consists of defining the locus of points where
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(jc
∗, r∗, `−1 , `+1 )] = ψ.
Figure 3 shows the shape of this locus on the plane `− × `+ (see the deriva-
tion of this shape in Appendix E). This line defines a border where points
to the lower/left constitute the exit region, while points to the upper/right
region constitute the stay region.
6.2 Further Implications on Firm Dynamics
The important thing to notice in figure 2 is the negative slope with abso-
lute value lower than one. Some important implications follow from this
decision rule. First, smaller firms tend to be closer to the border than larger
firms, which means smaller firms have lower survival probabilities than larger
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firms.19 It should be stressed though that this is not a deterministic rela-
tionship. For any firm in our “exit” region, but close enough to the border,
one can always find another firm of the same size, or even smaller, located
in our “stay” region.20 The non-deterministic negative relationship between
size and exit probability also features in the main theoretical frameworks of
firm dynamics, such as Ericson and Pakes (1995); and Klette and Kortum
(2004).
The fact that smaller firms are more inclined to leave the market provides
two other implications which are frequently mentioned in the literature of
firm dynamics. First, it makes the variance of employment growth larger
for this group than for larger firms. Second, the relationship between initial
size and employment growth for the overall firm population (including those
withdrawing from the market) is closer to Gibralt’s Law, than when we
restrict the population to surviving firms.21
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we developed a labor market model where several facts on
worker flow and firm dynamics were rationalized exclusively through em-
ployment decisions made by the firms. The main characteristics of the model
were imperfect information about the quality of new matches and search fric-
tions. When hiring workers, firms do not know whether there will be enough
workers to fill the open vacancies and, once a new worker comes in, they do
19A smaller firm tends to be to the left and below a larger firm.
20This is where the inclination lower than one is important.
21Gibrat’s Law says that firms’ employment growth rates are independent of size. Sutton
(1997) discusses intensively the validity of this law.
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not know the productivity level of that worker × firm match.
In developing this model we built an integrated framework of the labor
market in which replacement, job creation and job destruction were decided
simultaneously at firm level. We have shown that several interesting micro
implications come from this framework. These implications are not restricted
to matters of worker flows, as they also encompass some facts on firm dy-
namics. Moreover, we showed that all the results derived for firm dynamics
match empirical evidence documented by the related literature.
It should be stressed that other papers which offer comparable predictions
on firm dynamics rely on some sort of investment decision composing a more
elaborate production process. In our framework, the driving force for firm
dynamics was the same as for worker flows, namely the learning process
about match quality.
Desirable extensions of our framework would be an infinite horizon over-
lapping generation model to explore the macro implications of the model,
and the effects of policy experiments. This framework would be able to pre-
dict coherently the effects of such experiments on several dimensions, such as
job flows, unemployment flows, unemployment level, firms’ size distribution
and firms’ productivity distribution. This provides valuable information for
the welfare analysis of alternative policy interventions. For example, altering
firing costs, social contributions or minimum wage potentially will affect all
the above mentioned dimensions.
INSTITUTO DE PESQUISA ECONOˆMICA APLICADA
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Figure 1: Labor Demand for Incumbent Firms in the Second Period
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Figure 2: Labor Demand in the First Period
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Figure 3: Exit Decision Rule
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Appendices
A DERIVATION of r∗ and jc∗
The incumbent firm solves the following problem in the interim between first
and second periods:
max
r,jc
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(r, jc | ξ1, `1)]
s.t. r ≤ `−1 .
Another way of stating this problem, making the argument to be maxi-
mized an explicit function of r and jc, is the following:
max
r,jc
{z2 · (jc+ r)− a · (jc+ r)2 + k · r + p · [ξ1 · `1 + θ · (1− ξ1) · `1]− b · `1}
s.t. r ≤ `−1
where z2 and k correspond to:
z2 = {p · [s+ θ · (1− s)]− b− c} ·m(γ2)− c
and
k = [c− (p · θ − b)].
Applying the standard Kuhn-Tucker conditions to this problem generate
42
three blocks of restrictions that need to be satisfied. The first is related to
jc, the second to r, and the last to the lagrangian multiplier λ:
z2 − 2 · a · (jc+ r) ≤ 0
jc ≥ 0
[z2 − 2 · a · (jc+ r)] · jc = 0
z2 − 2 · a · (jc+ r) + k − λ ≤ 0
r ≥ 0
[z2 − 2 · a · (jc+ r) + k − λ] · r = 0
`−1 − r ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
(`−1 − r) · λ = 0
The following combinations of values for r and jc can occur:
• jc > 0 and r = `−1
According to the first block of equations above, if jc > 0 then
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z2 − 2 · a · (jc+ r) = 0.
Plugging this into the second block we get λ ≥ k, which implies a
positive λ. When we take this to the third block, we get r = `−1 . The
value of jc can then be written as
jc =
z2
2 · a − `
−
1 .
Finally, in order to have jc > 0, the following condition must be satis-
fied:
`−1 <
z2
2 · a.
• jc = 0 and r = `−1 > 0
According to the first block of equations above, if jc = 0 then
z2 − 2 · a · r ≤ 0,
which implies
`−1 ≥
z2
2 · a.
Concerning the restrictions on r, if r > 0, the second block implies
z2 − 2 · a · r + k = λ.
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On the other hand when we use r = `−1 in the third block, we get:
λ ≥ 0
Putting these two conditions together we have:
`−1 ≤
z2 + k
2 · a .
So the combination of jc = 0 and r = `−1 > 0 occurs when:
z2
2 · a ≤ `
−
1 ≤
z2 + k
2 · a .
• jc = 0 and r < `−1
The relationships between z2 and r derived above from jc = 0 and
r > 0 remain valid. We repeat them below for convenience:
z2 − 2 · a · r ≤ 0
z2 − 2 · a · r + k = λ.
However, when we take r < `−1 to the third block above we get λ = 0.
We can use this fact to recover the value of r from the equation above
as
r =
z2 + k
2 · a ,
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which in turn implies that
`−1 >
z2 + k
2 · a .
B DERIVATION of E1[pi∗2 | v1]
First, consider the following value function defined according to the optimal
labor demand policy in the second period:
pi2(ξ1, `1, r
∗, jc∗) = p · [ξ1 + θ · (1− ξ1)]− b·`1+z2·(jc∗+r∗)−a·(jc∗+r∗)2+k·r∗.
However, we have seen that r∗ and jc∗ are defined according to `−1 , which
in turn can be expressed as (1−ξ1) ·`1. So, plugging this definition of `−1 into
the solution for replacement and job creation allows us to write the second
period profit as
pi∗2(ξ1, `1) = {p · [ξ1 + θ · (1− ξ1)]− b} · `1+
(9)
(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2, `−1 > `−
(z2 + k) · (1− ξ1) · `1 − a · [(1− ξ1) · `1]2, `− < `−1 < `−
z2 · `− − a · (`−)2 + k · (1− ξ1) · `1, `−1 < `−.
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When firms are in the first period, they will look to the expected value of
the second period profit conditioned on the first period vacancy level, which
can be defined as below.
E1[pi
∗
2 | v1] = z1 · v1+
(10)
(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2,
(1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 > `−
(z2 + k) · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 − a · E1[(`−1 )2 | v1],
`− < (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 < `−
z2 · `− − a · (`−)2 + k · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1,
(1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 < `−.
We have used the following facts: µ1⊥ξ1, E[ξ1 | v1] = E[ξ1] = s and
E[`1 | v1] = m(γ1) · v1.
It would be useful to redefine the inequalities above in terms of v1. It is
easy to see that
v1 =
`−
(1− s) ·m(γ1)
v1 =
`−
(1− s) ·m(γ1) .
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This completes our derivation for the second component of first period
expected profit, which becomes:
E1[pi
∗
2 | v1] = z1 · v1+
(11)
(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2,
v1 > v1
(z2 + k) · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1 − a · E1[(`−1 )2 | v1],
v1 < v1 < v1
z2 · `− − a · (`−)2 + k · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1,
v1 < v1.
C UNIQUENESS of v∗1
The goal of this section is to describe sufficient conditions that guarantee a
unique solution to the problem of choosing the vacancy level at the start of
the first period. As discussed in the body of the paper, this choice is made
in order to maximize the present value of the expected profit conditioned
on behaving optimally in the second period given your choice of first period
vacancy. The definition for the expected profit is
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E1[pi1(v1) + ρ
′ · E1[pi∗2 | v1]] = [1 + ρ′] · z1 · v1 − a · (v1)2 − c · v1+
(12)
ρ′ ·

(z2 + k) · `− − a · (`−)2, v1 > v1
−a · E1[(`−1 )2 | v1] + (z2 + k) · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1, v1 < v1 < v1
z2 · `− − a · (`−)2 + k · (1− s) ·m(γ1) · v1, v1 < v1.
First, we disaggregate E1[pi
∗
2(v1)] into linear and non-linear components,
denoting them respectively by Rmg(v1) and Cmg(v1). They are illustrated
in figure 2 which shows three different regions (a, b and c) delimited by v1
and v1. Suppose the following restrictions hold:
Rmg−(v1) < Cmg−(v1)
Rmg+(v1) < Cmg
+(v1)
Rmg+(v1) < Cmg
+(v1)
That means the local maximum in region a is attained in the interior of
its domain and the local maximum in regions b and c is attained at their
respective left boundaries. When this is the case, the global maximum cor-
responds to the maximum in the first region, since the following relationship
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holds:
pi(v∗a) > pi(v
∗
b ) = pi(v1) > pi(v1) = pi(v
∗
c ).
The first and second restrictions correspond to the ones shown below.
The third one is not binding, since its requirement is guaranteed by the first
restriction:
2 · a · v1 > (1 + ρ′) · z1 − c+ k · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1)
2 · a · v1 + ρ′ · a · ∂E1[(`
−
1 )
2|v1]
∂v
> (1 + ρ′) · z1 − c+ (k + z2) · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1).
Now consider the first inequality above. It can be rewritten as:
z2
(1− s) ·m(γ1) > (1 + ρ
′) · (z2 + c) ·m(γ1)
m(γ2)
− c+ k · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1),
using the definition for v1 and the fact that
z1 =
(z2 + c) ·m(γ1)
m(γ2)
.
In the remainder of this section we will assume m(γ1) ∼= m(γ2), for the
sake of simplifying the notation. The argument to be developed does not
depend on this assumption. After rearranging the terms we get
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z2 · [1− (1 + ρ
′) · (1− s) ·m(γ1)
(1− s) ·m(γ1) > ρ
′ · c+ k · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1).
Finally, the fact that ∂z2
∂s
> 0 guarantees that the first inequality holds
when we increase s. The second inequality can be written as
z2 · [1− (1 + ρ
′) · (1− s) ·m(γ1)
(1− s) ·m(γ1) − ρ
′ · c+ k · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1)
> z2 · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1)− ρ′ · a ·
∂E1[(`
−
1 )
2 | v1]
∂v
.
We have just shown that the left hand side (LHS) is greater than zero
for a large enough s. The right hand side (RHS) can be restated as:
z2 · ρ′ · (1− s) ·m(γ1)− z2 · ρ
′ · (1− s)
m(γ1)
− z2 · ρ
′ · x
m(γ1) · (1− s)
where we have used the result below:
∂E1[(`
−
1 )
2 | v1]
∂v
= 2 · a · v1 ·
{(1− s)2 + var(1− s) + [m(γ2)]2 + var[m(γ2)]2}
and have denoted {var(1 − s) + [m(γ2)]2 + var[m(γ2)]2} as x. It is easy
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to see that this RHS is negative for any s, which allows us to establish the
following relationship:
LHS > 0 > RHS
Thus, a big enough s in an environment where m(γ1) = m(γ2) suffices to
guarantee a unique solution for v∗1 at a level lower than v1.
D THE NECESSARY CONDITION THAT DRIVES THE SO-
LUTION OF THE WAGE BARGAINING VERSION OF
THE MODEL
Consider a match that is revealed to be of low quality. At the beginning
of the second period, the worker in this match may decide either to quit or
to stay. The expected payoffs (EP ) related to each of these two decisions,
identified by superscripts, are the following:
EP q = q · {p · β · [s+ (1− s) · θ] + (1− β) · b}+ (1− q) · b
and
EP s = p · β · θ + (1− β) · b,
where q represents the probability of a job seeking worker finding a job at
the beginning of the second period, which is given by m(γ2)
γ2
. Straightforward
algebra can be used to show that workers will stay if:
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f(q) < p · θ − b,
where f(q) abbreviates p · q · θ + p · q · s · (1 − θ) − b · q. In what follows
we will show that any value for q below a threshold will make such workers
prefer to stay, as in the wage setting version of the model. First, note that
the condition is attained when q = 0. Hence showing that f ′(q) > 0 suffices
to prove our claim. In fact, we have that
f ′(q) = p · [s+ (1− s) · θ]− b > 0.
Finally, the threshold value for q which makes the worker indifferent be-
tween quitting and staying is:
q∗ =
p · θ − b
p · [s+ (1− s) · θ]− b.
E DERIVATION OF THE EXIT RULE
The main component of the exit rule consists of a line on the plane `−1 × `+1
which represents the locus of points where
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(jc
∗, r∗ | `−1 , `+1 )] = ψ.
The shape of this line is given by the partial derivative of `+1 with respect
to `−1 keeping constant the value function above. That is, we need to compute:
∂`+1
∂`−1
∣∣∣∣
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(jc
∗,r∗|`−1 ,`+1 )]=ψ
.
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Straightforward derivations imply that:
∂`+1
∂`−1
∣∣∣∣
Eξ2Eµ2 [pi2(jc
∗,r∗|`−1 ,`+1 )]=ψ
=
1
p− b

−[(p · θ − b) + k],
`−1 < `
−
2 · a · `−1 · [(p · θ − b) + k + z2],
`− < `−1 < `−
−(p · θ − b),
`−1 < `−.
It is easy to see that the the first and last regions have negative and con-
stant inclinations. In the intermediary region (`− < `−1 < `−) the inclination
raises monotonically with the level of `−1 . Plugging into the equation values
for `− and `−, one can see that the slope in this region varies monotonically
from the value of the first region to the value of the last region.
The last thing to be noticed is that throughout all three regions, the
inclination is always flatter than the 45 degrees line, as shown in figure 3.
The result to prove this fact is related to the slope of the first region, which is
higher than −1. As this is the steepest region, all the others will also satisfy
this condition.
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